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Abstract
The debate about the division of labor between the European Union 
(EU) and NATO has been ongoing ever since the former was created in 
1993. Much more sensitive than the details of EU- NATO relations is the 
question of whether the EU, as a supranational, state- like organization, is 
actually seeking more autonomy—not from the alliance but from the 
United States. The EU has become indispensable to the security of the 
European continent because its member states largely set overall strategy 
on foreign policy through the EU and because only EU membership can 
guarantee their political and economic power base. EU member states are 
now also endeavoring to generate more military capabilities through the 
EU. A viable transatlantic alliance, therefore, requires the US to interact 
more directly with the EU, in addition to its engagement through NATO.
*****
The transatlantic security architecture does not resemble a Le Cor-busier or Oscar Niemeyer design. It is not a neatly planned whole in which every component elegantly and effectively fulfils a specific 
function. It rather resembles a sprawling palace complex; every successive 
occupant has added, restyled, or abandoned another wing. It functions, but 
one would never build it this way if one were to start from scratch.
Unearthing the foundations of this complex architecture takes us back 
to the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. 
Initially, the US strongly supported European defense cooperation be-
cause it was wary of a permanent military commitment on the European 
continent. Washington pushed hard for the European Defence Commu-
nity, which would have merged the armed forces of France, West Ger-
many, Italy, and the three Benelux countries into a single European 
army—thus rearming Germany without recreating the German armed 
forces. When in 1954 that project failed, however, the emphasis shifted to 
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NATO. The US therefore ended up taking the lead in the security and 
defense sphere anyway, through NATO, while European integration as-
sumed a mostly economic focus through the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), created in 1957.
When the Cold War ended, this neat division of labor became more 
complex. In 1993 the European Union (EU) succeeded the EEC and 
gradually developed its own strategy, foreign policy, and defense policy for 
the post–Cold War world. Ever since, there has been debate between the 
EU and NATO about who does what. Officially, both organizations talk 
only about complementarity; they adopted joint declarations in 2016 and 
2018 and are working on 74 areas of cooperation.1 In reality, many decision- 
makers on both sides of the Atlantic see this as a zero- sum game: what 
strengthens the EU must of necessity weaken NATO and vice versa. An 
unhelpful beauty contest has developed between the two organizations. 
Even in the fight against the coronavirus, for example, both NATO and the 
EU were at pains to prove that they were coordinating the support that 
Europe’s armed forces were providing to the security and health services.
Nevertheless, if it were merely a matter of redefining the division of 
labor between the EU and NATO, this debate might have already been 
settled. Offering a view from Europe, the underlying and much more po-
litically sensitive question concerns the autonomy of the EU, as a state- 
like organization, not from NATO but from the US. The EU has already 
become indispensable to the security of the European continent because 
EU member states largely set overall strategy on foreign policy through 
the EU and because only EU membership can guarantee their political 
and economic power base. If EU member states are successful in their 
endeavor to generate military power through the EU, it would require a 
reconfiguration of the transatlantic architecture.
The Nature of the EU- NATO Relationship
Formally at least, the EU in its 2016 Global Strategy set itself the ob-
jective of achieving “strategic autonomy” in security and defense.2 The 
strategic community in the US nearly universally condemns this EU am-
bition as undermining NATO. On 1 May 2019, the under secretary of 
defense for acquisition and sustainment and the under secretary of state 
for arms control and international security even sent a joint letter to the 
EU in which they described some of the subsequent EU defense initia-
tives as “poison pills” for the transatlantic relationship.3
At the same time, the US keeps pressing its European allies to spend 
more on defense. The pledge they made at NATO’s Wales Summit in 
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2014, to “aim to move towards the 2% guideline” by 2024, has been re-
interpreted in Washington as an obligation to spend 2 percent of the 
GDP. At the July 2018 Brussels Summit, US president Donald Trump 
even spoke of a 4 percent spending target, though that was quietly ig-
nored by everybody else.4 In March 2019, however, he impetuously re-
turned to the charge with the idea that allies hosting American troops 
should pay the US the full cost of that deployment plus 50 percent. In 
June 2020 he announced a reduction of American troops in Germany—
apparently in retaliation for Germany’s alleged underspending.5 The US 
cannot have it both ways: it cannot realistically expect the Europeans to 
pay more without having more of a say.
The stated goals of the Global Strategy notwithstanding, the Europe-
ans remain very divided about strategic autonomy themselves. Some, such 
as French president Emmanuel Macron, but also German chancellor An-
gela Merkel, have grandly stated that the EU should take its destiny into 
its own hands.6 Others, especially in eastern Europe, are wary of upsetting 
the US without a firm alternative in place. In the EU institutions, the 
debate about the meaning of strategic autonomy has created much debate 
since 2016, but it has remained inconclusive. In 2020, the terms of the 
debate shifted; increasingly, EU member states and institutions now speak 
of “sovereignty” or “freedom of action.” The focus has now moved to the 
German initiative to draft a “strategic compass” to provide more political 
guidance for the EU’s defense policy, starting with an updated threat as-
sessment during the German presidency of the EU in the second half of 
2020. The Europeans have yet to decide, therefore, how autonomous they 
really want—and dare—to be in security and defense. The fact is that in 
many areas of international relations, the EU has already become an au-
tonomous actor because of its very nature.
The EU is a supranational union in which member states have pooled 
sovereignty. Joining the EU is like moving into an apartment building. 
Inside your own apartment, you can do as you please within certain rules 
and as long as you don’t overly disturb the neighbors. About the building 
as a whole, however, you still decide, but only as part of a collective deci-
sion by all the owners; you cannot decide to replace the elevator by your-
self. And you better participate in the meetings, tedious though they may 
be, for decisions are taken by majority and are binding even if you don’t 
attend. The EU is not a state, but it is not just an organization of states 
either; it is something in between, a state- like organization. That is why 
the EU has become an autonomous actor in its own right, in addition to 
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the individual actions of its member states, including in areas of inter-
national relations (most notably trade).
Foreign policy and defense constitute an exception: in these areas the 
EU as such is not an actor but still operates on an intergovernmental basis; 
member states take all decisions by unanimity. These member states are, of 
course, sovereign countries in that they make their own decisions. How-
ever, their national strategic autonomy—that is, their capacity to act on 
those decisions and to safeguard their interests by themselves—is non-
existent for most and severely constrained for the others. The individual 
European states mostly have but negative sovereignty: they can in all free-
dom decide not to do something, but each on its own cannot undertake 
significant actions. France, for example, can deploy a brigade—but not 
much more—to Mali and, even then, only with the support of other Eu-
ropeans and the US in terms of intelligence, transport, and so forth. The 
current European debate is about the extent to which EU member states 
should further pool their sovereignty, notably in defense, and thus become 
an autonomous actor in this area as well.
NATO, to continue the architectural analogy, is the neighborhood 
watch. Some of the owners in the EU building have joined it while others 
have not. It also has members from other buildings, including the huge 
mansion across the street—the US. The neighborhood watch is important, 
especially when security problems arise, but it does not shape your daily 
life; the EU building and your relations with the other owners in it does. 
NATO is fully intergovernmental; it is an organization of states. It can 
never be an actor in its own right, therefore, nor can it acquire autonomy; 
it always was and will be an instrument of its member states.
Whether increased EU autonomy in defense undermines NATO is, 
therefore, a meaningless question. One might as well ask whether US au-
tonomy undermines NATO. If the European members (and partners) of 
NATO that compose the EU were to decide to pool their defense efforts 
that would not in any way detract from the strength of the alliance—just 
like bilateral or trilateral cooperation between allies (Belgian- Dutch naval 
cooperation, for example, or the Dutch- German army corps) does not. Of 
course, if the EU member states were increasingly to act as a bloc within 
NATO, it would be more difficult for the US to maintain its predominant 
position in alliance decision- making. That is why the EU ambition of stra-
tegic autonomy is such a sensitive political issue.
The US has been facing this dilemma since the end of the Cold War. 
Should it continue to prioritize working with individual European allies 
through NATO? That would make it easier to maintain American leader-
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ship—but of less capable allies. Or should it support defense integration 
through the EU in the hope that this would render the Europeans mili-
tarily stronger and more capable of relieving the burden of the US, even if 
that would mean accepting a greater EU role in decision- making? Argua-
bly, whichever option the US chooses, it will have to accord a greater role 
to the EU. Today, although foreign policy remains an intergovernmental 
area, the EU plays an indispensable role in strategy making.
A Strategy for Foreign Policy
NATO was, of course, created long before the EU. As a consequence, 
many still perceive a hierarchy in which NATO comes first and the EU 
second, as if the EU can make decisions only within a prior strategic frame-
work set by NATO. In reality, things work the other way around: NATO 
provides a military instrument that is put to use within the framework of a 
foreign policy strategy defined elsewhere. As far as the US is concerned, it 
is in Washington; for EU member states, it is in Brussels—that is, if the 
EU works as it should. In practice, EU member states indeed do not arrive 
at a common EU strategy on each and every specific issue. The fact is that, 
in general, on issues of strategic importance, the Europeans cannot have 
much impact unless they adopt a collective EU approach. What could even 
the largest European states do alone about the war in Ukraine, the war in 
Syria, or the rise of China? If the EU does adopt a strategy and it coincides 
with US strategy, Europeans and Americans can then opt to have recourse 
to NATO if implementation requires military action.
The measures taken since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 
clearly illustrate the actual strategic “line of command.” The European 
reaction to the invasion depended on the relationship Europe wanted to 
offer Ukraine, the price Europe was willing to pay for it, and how Europe 
saw the long- term future of its relations with Russia itself. Certainly, the 
Europeans took into account Washington’s position. Nevertheless, these 
political and economic decisions could only be taken collectively, through 
the EU. Within this broadly defined EU understanding, the Europeans 
contribute military forces to Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics 
and Poland, under the NATO flag, while applying sanctions against Rus-
sia through the EU. Diplomatic initiatives at the highest level to end the 
conflict have mostly been undertaken by Germany and France. But their 
leverage also derives to a large extent from their membership in the EU: 
only the EU can apply or end economic and diplomatic sanctions. No 
individual European state will adopt sanctions unilaterally and risk the ire 
of Russia on its own.
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In those instances when the EU does not set strategy, NATO cannot 
fill the void. NATO obviously has neither the competence nor the au-
thority to step in and decide on issues of foreign policy, trade and invest-
ment, or energy; but even in defense, NATO will find it difficult to act if 
the EU is divided.
Absent an EU strategy, the majority of EU member states will have at 
most a token policy on big questions of foreign policy and security for lack 
of leverage, or they may simply follow US policy. Even larger member 
states, though perhaps more vocal, will find it difficult to act by themselves. 
If the lack of EU strategy is mostly the result of inertia, the US may still 
be capable of convincing many or most Europeans to follow its lead and 
to act jointly, either through NATO or through a broad coalition of the 
willing. Sometimes, even when there is a common EU position, an ad hoc 
coalition rather than NATO is the preferred option. This was the case of 
the US- led coalition against ISIS, created at NATO’s Wales Summit in 
2014 but not run as a NATO operation.
If, however, EU member states are actively divided on an issue, the US 
will find that it will then also be very difficult to mobilize NATO or to 
have more than a handful of European states sign up for an ad hoc coali-
tion. If the Europeans are divided when they meet in the EU, logically 
they will be no less divided when they meet in NATO or with the US. The 
example that best illustrates this scenario is the US- led invasion of Iraq in 
2003. As the EU was split right down the middle over the invasion, the 
US had to forgo the active support of all but a few European allies. The 
2011 air campaign in Libya is another example: formally presented as a 
NATO operation, it was in fact a British- French- US led coalition that 
made use of the NATO command structure. Very few European allies 
participated, and the EU initially abstained in the face of German dis-
agreement with the intervention. In such cases, the EU’s political and 
economic instruments and resources, many of which are controlled by the 
supranational European Commission, cannot be made available or at least 
not from the start. The implementation of a comprehensive approach will 
then be very difficult.
On issues of foreign policy, therefore, the US would be well advised to 
consult with the Europeans directly through the EU on a permanent ba-
sis. The EU is the only forum where the European allies can adopt and 
implement strategies on the major foreign policy issues of the day—
strategies that will shape the framework within which transatlantic co-
operation can take place. Deepening US- EU interaction on strategy is all 
the more necessary because the trend is for American and European poli-
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cies to diverge. The differences are obvious in the Middle East and the 
Gulf: the US has withdrawn from the Iran nuclear deal, while the EU 
continues to support it, and declines to choose sides in the regional com-
petition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Brussels, undermining the 
nuclear deal is widely seen as detrimental to Europe’s security interests. 
On multilateralism as well, divergences are growing. Washington and 
Brussels often identify the same problems with entities such as the World 
Trade and World Health Organizations. Whereas the EU answer is to 
engage and seek reform, the US has opted to withdraw and pull funding.
Future US administrations may perhaps shift gears again on these issues, 
but on China there is a strong bipartisan consensus that the US is engaged 
in a long- term strategic rivalry. This is the most important divergence, 
therefore, because it concerns the world order as a whole and China’s place 
in it and because it is unlikely to diminish. The Europeans are increasingly 
aware of the need to safeguard their sovereignty in the face of China’s 
growing influence but do not perceive China as a strategic threat in the 
same way as the US.7 The EU’s High Representative, Josep Borrell, has 
made it clear that Europeans cannot accept the idea that the world should 
organize itself around a new bipolarity between the US and China.8 Euro-
peans, in other words, are not keen to pick sides in Sino- American rivalry. 
This is a key reason why there is a desire in Europe to increase the strategic 
autonomy of the EU rather than stepping up defense efforts through 
NATO. At its December 2019 London meeting, NATO put China on its 
agenda—but that will not be sufficient. For the European allies, deterring 
Russia remains NATO’s raison d’être, and they do not see the alliance as 
the forum to make strategy on China. Any US administration will have to 
directly engage the EU on China because on many of the political and 
economic issues at stake, the EU rather than the individual member states 
has decision- making power.
Integrated Political and Economic Power
Supranational European integration is the foundation of the political 
and economic power of the EU member states. Although inequalities re-
main in their societies, the single market has allowed the Europeans to 
achieve unprecedented levels of prosperity. For most member states, quit-
ting the single market would amount to economic suicide. Thanks to EU 
measures, member states recovered from the 2008 financial crisis; the cri-
sis, in fact, led to further economic and financial integration. Likewise, 
recovery after the crisis caused by COVID-19 will be thanks to an EU 
support package. Member states do not always show solidarity from the 
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start, and the EU often arrives at decisions only after lengthy and painful 
negotiations. The point is that member states have pooled their sover-
eignty to create the single market with (for most members) a single cur-
rency; hence, only the EU can now make the required decisions in an 
economic or financial crisis. Thanks to European integration, the Europe-
ans have also achieved the scale to hold their own against the continent- 
sized great powers of the US, China, and Russia in economic and, to a 
lesser extent, political terms. The EU could certainly improve its geo- 
economic performance—as in putting its economic clout to use to pursue 
its strategic objectives—but if it holds any sway in world politics, it is be-
cause of European unity. The same goes increasingly for innovation and 
technology: here too scale has become ever more important. In the areas 
in which Europe has fallen behind, such as artificial intelligence, only a 
concerted EU effort could redraw the balance.
Post–World War Two, the US strongly encouraged European integra-
tion. The success of the EEC was intertwined with the success of NATO, 
cementing the American security guarantee to Europe. This has now come 
to work both ways, however. Before, the EEC and then the EU could not 
do without NATO. Now, because the EU has become indispensable to the 
political and economic stability of Europe, NATO can no longer do with-
out the EU either. Without the EU, there would be political instability 
and economic crisis, which could only result in rivalry between European 
states with limited power but a lot of mutual suspicion. And if the states 
of Europe once again became rivals, Europe would no longer be a source 
of allies for the US but of risks. In sum, if the EU were to flounder that 
would be the end of NATO as well. In such a scenario, the US might seek 
to replace a defunct NATO with a set of bilateral alliances—but not nec-
essarily with all current allies. Europeans would do well to understand that 
if another power would seek to exploit the floundering of the EU and 
NATO to gain control of significant parts of the European continent, the 
US might intervene but not necessarily in defense of all European states. 
Where the US would draw the line would depend on which parts of Eu-
rope it would judge to be essential to the American interest and on how 
many resources it would be willing to spend on Europe in the context of 
its strategic competition with China.
There are important tensions within the EU already today as some 
member states, such as Hungary, appear to be returning to more authori-
tarian forms of government. Such governments feel that they can safely 
violate fundamental EU values like the rule of law and human rights and 
antagonize their fellow EU member states because, in terms of defense, 
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the US will always have their back. The Trump administration has even 
openly sided with the Polish and Hungarian governments in their dis-
putes with EU institutions. Yet undermining the EU might precisely pro-
voke other powers to leverage that to their advantage while, as stated 
above, one cannot be sure of future US strategy. The current Polish gov-
ernment may feel that inviting the US to build a “Fort Trump” on its ter-
ritory is a sufficient guarantee against any eventuality. During conflict, 
though, the cavalry manning the fort may decide that those living around 
it are expendable. This is why the populist European political parties and 
governments actively undermining the cohesion of the EU are playing 
with fire—as are those Americans who support them. Hungarian prime 
minister Viktor Orbán may espouse the fiction of “illiberal democracy,” 
but he forgets that today the purpose of NATO is to defend not just the 
territory of its members but also the democratic model that they have 
created in their countries. That was not the case when NATO was founded, 
when for strategic reasons more than one dictatorship was invited to join. 
Today, any democratic government in a NATO ally would be hard- pressed 
to convince its public to put its armed forces in harm’s way to defend a 
dictatorship in another NATO country. It is first and foremost the EU’s 
responsibility to uphold democracy for all its members, yet it is surprising, 
and worrying, how little NATO, and the US, have to say about the demo-
cratic backsliding of several allies.
The worst- case scenario of disintegration of the EU will not come to 
pass. As the drawn- out Brexit process shows, leaving is easier said than 
done. The current lack of unity within the EU also weakens NATO. Un-
fortunately, the Hungarian government and others willingly allow them-
selves to be instrumentalized by other powers and, at their behest, tone 
down or block EU decision- making altogether. Since nearly all decisions 
on foreign and defense policy require unanimity, it is sufficient for another 
power to convince one or two capitals to betray the EU. So far this stipula-
tion has not appreciably affected the EU stance on Russia and Ukraine 
despite continued Russian attempts to divide the union. Nevertheless, 
China has often been very successful in recruiting member states as its 
agents and weakening or avoiding EU policies that it considers detrimen-
tal to its interests. Once again, since there is little scope for concerted 
transatlantic action in the absence of a broader EU strategic consensus, 
this weakens NATO and transatlantic cooperation as well.
Given that the European states gain leverage on the international scene 
through the EU, leaving the union is equal to giving up that leverage and 
becoming vulnerable to outside pressure from other powers. Brexit did not 
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even have to become a reality for the UK to already experience this. When 
in September 2018 a Royal Navy ship sailed through what China consid-
ers its waters in the South China Sea, Beijing explicitly warned London 
that such actions might jeopardize the future bilateral economic relation-
ship post- Brexit.9 China could never blackmail Britain to such an extent 
if it stayed in the EU, for it cannot afford to put economic relations with 
all of the union at risk. This means that, contrary to Britain’s assertions, 
Brexit does weaken NATO. London may decide not to give in to other 
powers, but it does provide China in particular with more leverage to in-
fluence British decision- making through nonmilitary means.
Generating Military Power
In the field of defense, European integration has finally become indis-
pensable as well, but defense is far less advanced than other areas. During 
the Cold War, when the European states maintained large conscript forces, 
each had the scale to create a full- spectrum force or at least a very broad 
range of capabilities; integrating defense efforts was not necessary. Today, 
however, smaller- scale forces, smaller defense budgets, and inordinately 
more expensive arms and equipment mean that not a single European 
state can maintain a full- spectrum force of any significant size. Fragmen-
tation and protectionism have resulted in a patchwork of national forces 
of mostly low readiness. Taken together, these national forces do not con-
stitute a comprehensive full- spectrum force package. There are critical 
shortfalls in terms of strategic enablers, reserve forces, and stocks of muni-
tions and equipment. Consequently, Europe depends on the US for any 
major deployment. The European allies have agreed, in the framework of 
NATO, to spend more on defense. But if each state continues to do so 
separately, the status of Europe’s armed forces and their dependence on 
the US will basically remain unaltered, even if they all spend 2 percent of 
their GDP. Only by pooling their defense efforts could a group of Euro-
pean states field a comprehensive full- spectrum force package, including 
the strategic enablers that allow capabilities to be projected at the borders 
of Europe and beyond.
The EU is not the only framework in which the required pooling of 
efforts could be organized, but it definitely is the most promising one. 
Twenty- five EU member states have joined Permanent Structured Coop-
eration (PESCO) institutionalizing defense collaboration in the union, 
while the commission has set up the European Defence Fund (EDF) that, 
for the first time ever, will provide defense funds in the EU budget. If it is 
put to maximum use, PESCO can become the single platform where Eu-
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ropeans organize themselves to collectively develop all the capabilities 
that they require to meet their EU as well as NATO targets. Rather than 
undermining NATO, PESCO could help NATO ensure that the addi-
tional means that the European allies are making available are put to the 
best possible use.10 Many Americans and Europeans are understandably 
skeptical of PESCO since, in the past, so many EU (and NATO) attempts 
to promote defense cooperation failed to produce meaningful results. 
PESCO is different in that unlike all previous informal initiatives (such as 
“pooling and sharing” in the EU and “smart defense” in NATO), it is now 
part of the institutional setup of the EU. In other words, it will not go 
away. Just like under the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), 
member states will be systemically held accountable. That does not guar-
antee that PESCO will work (just like few allies meet all of their NDPP 
targets)—but that is all the more reason why NATO and the US should 
encourage rather than question it.
Naturally, if and when the Europeans spend more, they will purchase 
European arms and equipment. For NATO, that is not an issue, but it has 
become one for the Trump administration. It was always unrealistic of 
Washington, however, to expect that all additional means would be used 
to place orders in the US. One of the reasons why the “poison pill” letter 
mentioned above caused such a stir in Brussels is that Europeans read it as 
being motivated by narrow US defense industrial concerns rather than by 
strategic interests. For the Europeans, defense industrial autonomy is but 
a logical exponent of the overall economic and technological autonomy 
that the EU, just like all other powers, aspires to. So if PESCO works, 
Europe will buy more—but not only—European products. If PESCO 
and the EDF are successful, the EU could become indispensable in mili-
tary capability development.
The EU aims also to put those capabilities to use and to conduct certain 
expeditionary operations autonomously in the broad neighborhood of 
Europe. Doing so is in line with the long- standing but still unachieved 
EU objective of being able to deploy and sustain up to an army corps and 
equivalent naval and air forces (the so- called Helsinki Headline Goal 
from 1999). Autonomous operations do not necessarily mean EU opera-
tions, though. In practice—yet not always apparent from EU rhetoric—
these can be operations under any flag (EU, NATO, UN, national, ad hoc 
coalition) but under the political control and strategic direction of Euro-
pean governments, with a European general or admiral in command, and 
relying only on European forces and assets.
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Seen from NATO, the bone of contention is the command and control 
(C2) of such operations: Is the EU seeking to create a standing operational 
headquarters alongside the NATO C2 structure? NATO and the EU do 
have an arrangement, the Berlin Plus agreement, to allow the EU access to 
NATO C2. Many in Europe see this as unsatisfactory, however, because it 
requires the EU to pass through the North Atlantic Council and then 
SHAPE rather than directly interacting with a specific NATO headquar-
ters. Such a circuitous delegation amounts to an abdication of control. If a 
standing EU headquarters is undesirable, the only other alternative would 
be to give the EU or an ad hoc coalition of European states direct access to 
the NATO headquarters, which would conduct an individual operation 
(such as Naples that commanded the Libya air campaign). Arguably, the 
US should welcome autonomous European operations. If the Europeans 
were capable of singly handling any contingency in their neighborhood 
falling below the threshold of Article 5 (NATO’s collective defense guar-
antee) that would allow Washington to focus its attention on Asia.
Precisely because Asia and, more specifically, China, is now the focus of 
American strategic attention, the Europeans might also have to consider 
whether even in the area of collective territorial defense they should not 
aspire to more autonomy. The US has adopted a one- war standard for its 
defense effort geared to defeating a great power.11 The question for the 
Europeans is what would happen if the US were absorbed in an escalating 
crisis in Asia: Should they be able to deter and, if necessary, defend them-
selves against any military threat? Would American reinforcements arrive 
as soon and in such numbers as expected? The idea of more European 
autonomy in territorial defense (whether imagined as a European pillar 
within NATO or through the EU) is anathema to the US and to most 
European governments. It is the US pivot to Asia that has invited such 
thinking, however. Washington could indeed also wish to see more Euro-
pean independence in defense as enabling its pivot. The fact is, given the 
resources and the willpower required, European autonomy in territorial 
defense could only become reality in the long term.12
Conclusion
The most strategic decision that the European states have taken since 
the end of the Second World War was to launch European integration. 
This could not have taken off without NATO: it prospered thanks to the 
stability that the American security guarantee, embodied in the alliance, 
provided. Today, the EU itself has become indispensable to the stability of 
Europe, and now NATO can no longer do without the EU either. There is 
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no going back to pre- EU days, at least not as a matter of choice. For the 
first time in history, Europe has united voluntarily rather than through 
force of arms (as Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler 
all attempted—and failed). Therefore, the unravelling of the EU could 
only be the result of a catastrophic crisis; it would signal the return of 
intra- European rivalry and possibly even war. In a world that has seen a 
return to great power rivalry, in political, economic, and military terms the 
Europeans should strengthen their unity and deepen EU integration to 
maintain their chosen way of life. The US ought to encourage them in that 
effort and work more directly with the EU, in addition to NATO, if it 
wants the Europeans to support its strategy.
It is always likely, of course, that Europeans and Americans will just 
muddle through without any fundamental change in the way that EU- 
NATO and EU- US relations operate. The current situation may, at times, 
suit the US. An EU that can muster but a weak strategic consensus and 
does not adopt strong courses of action may be easier to mobilize for US- 
led initiatives—and will at least not cause interference with American 
policies. Herein lies the eternal dilemma for the US: relatively weaker 
European allies may be easier to recruit for American designs, but will 
they be able to contribute much to their implementation? If allies are too 
weak, they might actually hinder implementation and handicap the alli-
ance. They may even become a source of security problems.
The other option therefore is to deepen EU integration and reconfigure 
the alliance with the US accordingly. The obvious steps to take would be to 
introduce decision- making by majority in EU strategy and foreign policy 
and to use PESCO and the EDF to maximally streamline the European 
defense effort. The aim would be to shift the center of gravity from the na-
tional capitals to Brussels in both diplomacy and defense. If the EU were to 
manage this—but it is a very tall order—then over time it would make sense 
to begin to think of NATO as a bilateral alliance between the US and the 
EU as such rather than between the US and a host of individual European 
states. This is what some American authors are proposing as the only way of 
actually forcing the Europeans to shape an adequate defense.13 For the US, 
the dilemma remains: What is worse—European strategic autonomy or the 
absence of it? For the EU itself, muddling through remains the most likely 
scenario. Taking this route is highly unlikely to be sufficient to safeguard the 
European interest in the face of external powers actively trying to divide and 
subvert EU member states. For the great powers, Europe is but one of the 
theaters where their rivalry is playing out. Basically, Europe’s choice is this: 
to be an actor or to be a theater prop. 
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